To begin with, let me first thank the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for inviting me to attend this Conference. It is a
pleasure and an honor for me to have this opportunity to exchange views on issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) with so many high governmental officials and distinguished scholars.

The good momentum of the international non-proliferation efforts maintained since the end of the Cold War was severely interrupted by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear test last May. How to repair and consolidate the damaged international non-proliferation regime is a pressing task facing us today. Whether we can cope with it effectively will have far-reaching impacts on the future development of the international situation. I’d like to share with you some of my thoughts on this issue from the nuclear, biological, chemical and missile perspectives.

The NUCLEAR non-proliferation regime was the hardest hit by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. It is of vital importance that
further proliferation of nuclear weapons be prevented.

To this end, first and foremost, we must exert all our efforts to stop and reverse the nuclear development programs of India and
Pakistan. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have presented the international community with both a challenge and an
opportunity. In a sense, these events have become a litmus test to the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation regime. If
the international community could take effective measures to stop or even reverse the two countries' nuclear development programs, the authority and vitality of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime will be immeasurably enhanced. To achieve this, two things are important. First, the international community should have sufficient patience and perseverance, and should not lose hope because of the lack of progress in the short run. Second, the international community, especially the major powers, must have a consensus view and take concerted actions on this matter. A robust international non-proliferation regime is in the interests of all countries. If any country seeks to exploit the South Asian situation to obtain unilateral short-term political, economic or strategic benefits at the expense of the other countries and the international solidarity, and into al1 disregard of the serious consequences the South Asian nuclear testing has had on the international non-proliferation regime, it can only further undermine the already badly damaged international non-proliferation regime, and in the end, the long-term interests of that country will also be jeopardized. It is a direct violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172 to negotiate, or even to discuss, with India on India's so-called minimum nuclear deterrence capability. It is also unhelpful to publicly support India's permanent membership in the U.N. Security Council soon after its nuclear tests. It is obvious that these actions will not help in repairing the damage caused by the South Asian nuclear tests to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Secondly, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be replenished. At present, this includes three main aspects.
First is the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). All states concerned should sign and ratify the treaty as soon as
possible, as that the Treaty can enter into force at an early date. China is accelerating its preparatory work and will submit the
Treaty to the People's Congress for ratification in the first part of this year, with the hope that the ratification procedures can be
completed before September. Second is the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Negotiation should start as soon a s possible.
All states should make the necessary efforts and demonstrate the necessary political will to conclude a good treaty at an early date, which guarantees the adherence of all states capable of producing nuclear materials. The third aspect is to strengthen nuclear export control. China joined the Zangger Committee in October, 1997 and has promulgated the regulations on Nuclear Exports Control and on the Export Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technologies. Due to historical reasons, China has not joined the NSG so far, but we support its non-proliferation objectives and has actually incorporated both its control lists, in their entirety, into China's own national regulations. In this connection, we have noted with concern that after the Indian nuclear tests, some NSG members have taken a more pro-active stand on issues of nuclear cooperation with India. We hope that these countries could be more cautious in this area.

Thirdly, the nuclear disarmament process should be accelerated. The fundamental solution to nuclear proliferation lies with complete nuclear disarmament. We do not believe their exits a cause and effect relationship between the present lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and the Indian nuclear testing, as claimed by the Indian government. But, as the same time, we fully recognize that an accelerated pace of nuclear disarmament will certainly be conductive to consolidating the international non-proliferation regime. The United States and the Russian Federation are duty-bound to take the lead in nuclear disarmament. We hope that STAART II could be effective and implemented, and the negotiation on START III initiated, as soon as possible. On such basis, the two countries should further reduced their nuclear arsenals so as to prepare the ground for other nuclear weapon states to join in the process.

Last but not least, the role of nuclear weapons should be further diminished. The nuclear deterrence policy based on the first-use of nuclear weapons highlights the discriminatory nature of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, which does not help to
strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime or to dissipate the misconception of countries like India that the
possession of nuclear weapons is the short-cut to the status of a world power. We are pleased to note that Germany and Canada
have advocated that NATO should abandon its policy of first use of nuclear weapons. We hope that positive results could come out of the on-going debates within NATO on this matter.

 Compared to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the international regime against the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, which is based on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), is more
justified and less discriminatory, but it's by no means problem-free.

With respect to chemical weapons, the relationship between CWC and the Australia Group is a thorny issue. CWC, a treaty which was concluded after extended multilateral negotiations, and has as many as 121 states parties, contains in it clear provisions on the export of sensitive chemicals, accompanied with long schedules. We do not deny the right of any country to stipulate stricter export controls than that required by CWC, and establish small groups for that purpose. However, the existence of the Australia Group has resulted in discrepancies in the legal provisions of difference countries, which has created a de facto split legal system within the CWC states parties. This inevitably causes confusion and affects the normal international trade of chemicals. This problem is compounded by the seemingly irresistible inclination of certain countries to impose their own standards or even their own domestic legislation onto other countries, thus giving rise to unnecessary international disputes. All this has seriously undermined the authority of the CWC. To rectify this situation, there are only two ways as so far as I can see, namely, to dissolve the Australia Group or to amend the CWC to bring it in line with the requirements of the Australia Group. Any way, there must be a single standard rather than two.

The faithful implementation of the existing international treaties is the prerequisite for the strengthening of the non-proliferation
regime. CWC has been in force for almost two years, but certain country has still not submitted its complete declarations, as
required by the Convention, and has even passed their own national legislation, which openly contravenes the provisions of the
Convention. Such a practice of putting one's national legislation above the international law and refusing to fulfill one's obligations
under an international treaty cannot but cause concern.

With respect to biological weapons, the negotiation on a protocol aimed at strengthening the BWC has entered its final stage. The
establishment of any verification system should be guided by the principles of fairness, appropriateness and effectiveness.
Otherwise, verification weakens rather than strengthens the non-proliferation regime. In this connection, there are many lessons to
be drawn from the weapons inspections in Iraq. We must have a realistic estimate of the role of verification. The purpose of
verification 

Is to deter potential violators from violating its obligations. At the same time, we should be realistic enough to see that no verification regime, however perfect or complete, could provide 100% guarantee that no violations could happen. Therefore, verification measures should be appropriate and feasible. If they are too intrusive and affect the legitimate security or economic interest of the states parties, or too costly and impossible to sustain in along run, they will not be able to get wide-spread support, and in the end the universality of the treaties will be undermined, which in turn, will be detrimental to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

Devoid of any legal basis in international law, missile non-proliferation is the most under-developed part of the entire international
non-proliferation regime. As the founders of the Missile and Technology Control Regime (MTCR) admitted, MTCR is just a
time-winning device. Its purpose is to delay missile proliferation rather than provide a comprehensive solution to this problem. Even
this limited role was somehow diminished by the regime's lack of objective criteria, and the double standard applied by certain MTCR members in implementing requirements of the regime. Recent developments have shown that the risk of missile proliferation is increasing. It is time for the international community to take a collective look at the missile proliferation issue, including MTCR, and explore better ways to combat this danger.

One cannot discuss missile proliferation without mentioning theater Missile Defense (TMD). We are deeply concerned about certain countries' efforts to develop advanced TMD or even NMD, for the following reasons:

First, the development of advanced TMD or even NMD will have negative impacts on the regional or even global strategic stability.
Like nuclear weapons, missiles can proliferate both horizontally and vertically. If a country, in addition to its offensive power, seeks
to develop advanced TMD or even NMD, in an attempt to attain absolute decurity and unilateral strategic advantage for itself, other
countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles. This will give rise to a new round of arms race, and will be in
nobody's interest. To avoid such a situation, it is extremely important to maintain and strengthen the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM). During the Cold War, ABM was one of the cornerstones of the strategic stability between the United States and the former
Soviet Union, which made it possible for the two countries to make deep cuts into their respective nuclear arsenals. After the Cold
War, with the world moving rapidly towards multi-polarity, the significance of ABM Treaty has increased rather than decreased.
Some scholars have put forward the idea of making the ABM Treaty a multilateral treaty. I think this is an idea worthy of our serious consideration.

Secondly, transferring TMD systems to other countries or region, or jointly developing them with other countries, will inevitably result in the proliferation of missile technology. Missile and anti-missile technologies are related. Many of the technologies used in
anti-missile systems are easily applicable in offensive missiles. This is one of the main reasons why China stands against the
cooperation between the United States and Japan to develop TMD and opposes any transfer of TMD systems to Taiwan. We hope
that the U.S. Government could take a more cautious and responsible attitude on this matter. China's opposition to U.S. transfers of TMD to Taiwan is also based on anothr major concern, namely, its adverse impact on China's reunification. TMD in Taiwan will give the pro-independence forces in Taiwan a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless movers. This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Strait or even in the entire North-East Asian region.

These are my views on some non-proliferation's issues. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that the proliferation problem can not be solved without taking the large international environment into consideration. It is important that a fair and just new world order be
established whereby all states treat each other with equality. The big and powerful should bot bully the small and the weak. And all
disputes should be solved peacefully, without resort to the use or threat of force. This is the most effective way to remote the
fundamental motivations of countries for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, thus the best approach to non-proliferation.
 

Remarks of Mitsuru Kurosawa, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Japan

Almost four years have passed since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and we have only one year and three months before we get together at 2000 Review Conference. The 1995 Conference was significant to decide an indefinite extension of the Treaty as a package with two important decisions. One is on Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty, and the other is on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
On nuclear disarmament, the document on Principles and Objectives listed three concrete measures;
1)the completion of the negotiations on a CTBT no later than 1996, 2)the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a FMCT, and 3)the determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally.
The first measure, that is, a CTBT, was completed by adopting a treaty by the UN General Assembly in September 1996. However, a thorny issue how to make the treaty enter into force still remains. The second measure, the negotiation on a FMCT is supposed to begin soon at the CD in Geneva because an establishment of an ad hoc committee was agreed last August. On the third measure, it is nice to hear that the implementation of the START I Treaty is proceeding ahead of the schedule. However, the START II Treaty which was signed in January 1993, six year ago, has not been implemented because of the lack of ratification by Russia. In March 1997, the U.S. and Russia agreed a framework of a START III Treaty, which includes the obligation to reduce each nuclear warhead to 2,000-2,500 by the year 2007. Negotiation of a START III will not start until Russia ratifies the START II Treaty.
Other measures included in the document on Principles and Objectives are establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone and further
measures for security assurances. We see no achievement in these fields except some progress for establishing a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.Overall evaluation for the progress in nuclear disarmament since the 1995 Conference is far less than expected. Here, I would like to propose four measures for nuclear disarmament which should be taken before the 2000 Conference.
First, the U.S. and Russia should begin the negotiations on a START III Treaty even before Russia ratifies the START II Treaty. In
March 1997, the Presidents agreed main features of a START III Treaty at Helsinki Summit. They would include, among other things, establishment by December 31, 2007, of lower aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the parties. This would also include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measure, to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including the prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. At the same time, they agreed to extend the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under the START II Treaty to December 31, 2007.
These measures are significant because they were tailored to meet Russia’s concern that they would have to build additional
single-warhead missiles to maintain parity, while destroying multiple warhead ICBMs under the original framework, and that costs
would be beyond their ability to comply with the START II deadline. In this sense, these measures are very useful to correct
unbalanced obligations and help Russia implement their obligations, and are helpful in removing main reason why Russia has been reluctant to ratify the START II Treaty.
In November 1998, in Russia, a government report was delivered to parliament warning that Russia’s nuclear forces will shrink
dramatically and unavoidably in the years ahead as a result of weapon’s obsolescence and national economic decline. Russia’s
First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov reportedly estimated that because of obsolescence and other factors, Russia may be
able to field only 800 to 900 nuclear warheads seven years from now. Given this situation, many thought that Russia’s security
would be maintained by reducing U.S. nuclear warheads under the START II Treaty. 
With this background, Russia’ s Duma was supposed to start the debate on START II Treaty based on the draft of the Federal Bill on START II ratification in middle or late December 1998. However, the lower house of the Russian Parliament has delayed
consideration of the Treaty until its spring session out of anger over the U.S. and British bombing of Iraq. 
At this time, Russia’s opposition to the Treaty is not against its content but a result of linkage policy with Iraqi issue. This sharply
contradicts Duma’s traditional stance. It is very important that they no longer oppose to the content of the Treaty.
On the other hand, in the United States, in November 1998, Pentagon officials were reportedly recommending the Administration to consider unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons because of budget constraints as much as diminishing security threat. In December 1998, President Bill Clinton was also reportedly considering unilateral cuts in U.S. nuclear warheads that would match reductions in the Russian arsenal due to disintegration from a lack of money and manpower.
Under these circumstances, it would be a good idea to begin START III negotiations without waiting for Russian ratification. This
would keep the negotiation momentum going for further reductions, and would give Russia a stronger incentive for START II
ratification.
The main parameters of a START III Treaty have already been agreed, and elaborating each provision of the Treaty would not be
difficult because both countries have enough experience gained in the process of drafting the START I and II Treaties. There is a
precedent for agreement on a new treaty before an earlier one enters into force - the START II Treaty was signed in January 1993
before the START I Treaty entered into force in December 1994.
The beginning of START III negotiations would continue the process of nuclear reduction, signature of the START III Treaty would
confirm this reduction, and ratification of the START III Treaty would open the way to START IV.

Secondly, the U.S. and Russia should begin negotiations on a bilateral treaty on fissile material cut-off, transparency and
irreversibility. It is very good news that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva agreed to establish an ad hoc committee for negotiating a cut-off treaty. The mandate of a committee is to negotiate a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device. The CD is going to negotiate a multilateral cut-off treaty. It seems to me that the negotiation will take a long time, and even the agreement on the scope of prohibition will be difficult to attain soon.
In parallel with or ahead of the multilateral negotiations at the CD, the U.S. and Russia should begin bilateral negotiations on
transparency and irreversibility of the process of nuclear disarmament which include regulation of stockpiles, as well as prohibition of future production of nuclear fissile material.
As a precedent, President Bush and President Gorbachev concluded an Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons in June 1990. This bilateral agreement was an important and necessary step towards a multilateral, comprehensive and global Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), and increased political pressure on those still reluctant to support a global convention.
There exist preconditions for bilateral negotiations. First, on September 23, 1997, the U.S. and Russia agreed on cooperation
regarding plutonium production reactors. Under it, they will not restart any of their plutonium production reactors that have already
shut down, and Russia will convert by December 31, 2000, its three operating reactors so that they cease all production on
non-reactor-grade plutonium. Verification on shutdown reactors and converted reactors will be introduced. With these agreements,
they could transform their non-production moratorium into legally binding obligations. If highly enriched production plants, currently
active as well as closed, were included in the verification system, it would be tantamount to a cut-off treaty.
Second, since President Clinton’s September 1993 policy statement, the U.S. has placed about 12 metric tons of excess plutonium and HEU under IAEA safeguards, and a total of 90 metric tons of fissile material has been committed to be under IAEA safeguards.
Third, in December 1997, the IAEA began the independent verification of excess highly enriched uranium downblending operations at the Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plant in Ohio. The IAEA verified that the approximately 3.5 metric tons of highly enriched uranium being downblended has indeed removed irreversibly from U.S. defense uses.
Fourth, under the Trilateral Initiative, launched on September, 1996, the U.S., Russia and the IAEA are considering practical
measures for the application of IAEA verification to weapon-origin fissile material.
Fifth, on July 24, 1998, the U.S. and Russia concluded an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation in the management of plutonium that has been withdrawn from nuclear military programs. Management means the transformation of plutonium into spent
fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons. In September 1998, they agreed that both countries will each remove
approximate 50 tons of plutonium from their respective nuclear weapon program and convert it into a form that will assure it can never again used in such weapons.
Sixth, in May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol for the Part 2 of Program 93+2, or the Strengthened Safeguards System. All five nuclear powers have announced their intention to apply some of the new safeguards to their non-military facilities. The U.S. announced on May 16, 1997, that it would accept the new measures in their entirety except where they involve information and location of direct national security significance. On June 11, 1998, the Board approved an additional protocol for the U.S.
Based on these recent progress, it would be possible to negotiate and conclude a bilateral treaty which not only prohibits future
production of fissile material but also ensures transparency and irreversibility of nuclear reduction. It would be of great utility as an
example for other nuclear-weapon states and de facto nuclear-weapon states.
A treaty should include following measures. Parties should undertake not to produce fissile material for weapon purposes. In order to verify this obligation, all HEU and plutonium production plants for both peaceful and military purposes, either currently active or
closed, should be under safeguards or verification conducted by the IAEA. Safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities should be
conducted as short-notice random inspections taking into account of the principle of cost-effectiveness.
Parties should put their excess nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons under the IAEA safeguards and verification. They should agree on a schedule for transformation in a legally binding form. Otherwise, the transformation would take a long time. 
Parties should inform the international society how much fissile material is in the process of transformation, that is, how much is still in weapon form though they have been removed from weapon system, or how much is in pits designated to be dismantled. Hopefully, they should register the number of their nuclear weapons currently deployed and reserved to show how nuclear reduction is proceeding and ensure its irreversibility. The IAEA safeguards and verification should be applied at as early a stage of the process as possible.

Thirdly, the U.S and Russia should begin negotiations on non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the Joint Statement on Parameters of
Future Reduction of March 1997, the Presidents agreed that in the context of START III negotiations their experts explore possible
measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) and tactical nuclear systems.
During the START I negotiations, the issue of SLCM was controversial and resulted in a politically binding declaration outside of the Treaty, which set its ceiling at 800. Currently no nuclear SLCMs are deployed, although the U.S. has a capacity to redeploy
anytime. In accordance with unilateral but parallel actions taken by both states, many tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from operational forces in 1991 and 1992. However, their real implementation is not clear and Russia is believed to have as much as a 10-fold advantage.
In contract to strategic nuclear forces whose number and location is almost all clear, the number and location of non-strategic
nuclear forces is not precisely known. The U.S. has fewer than 180 nuclear warheads deployed in Europe, and Russia is believed to deploy about 4,500 nuclear warheads with additional 10,000 warheads whose status is unclear. Although both countries have
unilaterally withdrawn non-strategic nuclear forces to their homelands after the end of the Cold War, there is no legally binding
obligation to keep this situation.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military is not as strong as before due to a lack of money and morale. As Russia lost superiority in conventional forces against NATO, with the decrease of conventional forces and arms, Russia has shifted their military policy to depend more on nuclear weapons, as shown in the policy declaration in September 1993 where Russia abandoned its no-first-use policy. In addition, recent NATO expansion eastward has stimulated Russia to reemphasize the role of tactical nuclear weapons.
It is generally said that non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia are not under strict control, and there is the fear that they may be
launched by misconduct or stolen by terrorists.
It would be necessary to make the status quo legally binding by concluding a treaty in order to prevent a new arms race in tactical
nuclear weapons and to maintain their safety and security. Further, non-strategic nuclear weapons which are still deployed or in
reserve should be put under strict physical control.
One approach would be to prohibit the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons already withdrawn to each homeland. The other
approach would be to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Easter Europe and in former Soviet republics except
Russia, which would legally prohibit deployment of nuclear weapons in new members of NATO or Beralus. Beyond it, we should
examine the possibility of elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Fourthly, five nuclear-weapon states should discuss deeply the issue of no-first use and negative security assurances. Just before
the 1995 NPT Conference, on April 11, 1995, UN Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was adopted, which referred to declarations of five nuclear-weapon states on negative security assurances. The Principles and Objectives said, "further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument." There was some progress in negative security assurances in the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Otherwise, there has been no progress in this field and the situation seems to be getting worse. In particular, recent U.S. statements declare the possibility that the U.S. may use nuclear weapons against an attack by chemical or biological weapons. The U.S. is inventing a new mission for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, but this new policy may contradict the U.S. policy statement on negative security assurances of April 5, 1995. Should we understand that the U.S. has changed its nuclear policy since 1995?

The International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion in July 1996, saying, "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, an in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."

Although an advisory opinion does not have legally binding force, it has been accepted as having high authority. Even if you
understand the latter half permissively, the case where a state can use it is severely restricted. A state has to fulfill all conditions for self-defense like a response against unlawful armed attack, urgency, proportionality and, in addition, the very survival of a state must be at stake.

Recent reports, like "Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" in August 1996, "An Evolving US Nuclear Posture", the second report by the Henry L. Stimson Center in December 1995, and "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy" by National Academy of Science in June 1997, all recommend that the role of nuclear weapons should be restricted to deter use of nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War, they argue, the policy that nuclear weapons will be used against conventional
attack as formulated during the Cold War era, has lost its foundation Germany’s new Administration of Social Democrats and Greens includes no-first use pledge in its governing program, and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued for the discussion on this issue in the talks with NATO Secretary-General Javier Solona in November 1998. In December 1998, at NATO foreign ministers meeting, he repeated the view that NATO should revise its stance and renounce the policy of first use of nuclear weapons.

On December 10, 1998, the Standing committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, House of Commons, has submitted a
report "Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century". As
Recommendation 15, the Committee recommends that the Government of Canada argue forcefully within NATO that the present
re-examination and update as necessary of the Alliance Strategic Concept should include its nuclear component.

In this circumstance, nuclear-weapon states, in particular, the United States should begin the reexamination of the policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. As the main reason for the U.S. not to pledge a no-first use policy is to maintain nuclear deterrent against chemical or biological attacks by rogue states, firstly, the possibility of mutual no-first use pledges among five nuclear-weapon
states should be discussed and agreed.

Secondly, the possibility of deterrence by conventional weapons should be examined against chemical or biological attacks, and
efforts should be made to get universality of the Chemical Weapon Convention and the Biological Weapon Convention. As an interim measure, a policy of no-first use against the states parties to both CWC and BWC would encourage or give incentive to non-parties to accede to the Conventions. 

The Current Debate over Sanctions and Non-Proliferation
Remarks by Leonard Weiss (U. S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C).

1998 was not a happy year for non-proliferators and arms controllers. The Russian Duma failed to ratify START II, North Korea was caught building an underground facility that might be part of their ostensibly frozen nuclear weapons program, India and Pakistan set off a series of nuclear weapon tests in the apparent belief that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have great political value as well as deterrent capability, Saddam Hussain underscored the latter point by provoking bombing attacks on Iraq as a result of denying access to possible weapon sites by Unscom, and NATO validated the beliefs in the political power of nuclear weapons by the Indians, Pakistanis, Iraqis, North Koreans, and others, by refusing to adopt a no-first-use policy for such weapons.
Adding to this dismal picture is the rising opposition to the use of sanctions as a foreign policy and non-proliferation tool in the United States and elsewhere. If sanctions for proliferators cannot be politically sustained, the international non-proliferation regime risks becoming a Potemkin Village in the eyes of those who do not adhere to its principles. So the debate over sanctions is important.
Until it became preoccupied with Bill Clinton’s sex life, the U.S. Congress was the most visible venue for this debate, although its incomparable facility for cognitive dissonance on this subject was on spectacular display last year. Thus, we were treated to passionate arguments by some members about the evils of unilateral sanctions and the introduction of legislation that would end it - except if it was designed to open up some foreign markets for American corporations. Other members viewed sanctions strictly through an ideological prism: Sanctions against "rogue" states, meaning states intensely disliked by the U.S., are ok; sanctions against "friendly" states are not ok, even if they engage in proliferant behavior similar to that of the "rogue" states. Many have no problem with sanctions as long as they are multilateral. The problem is that in a multipolar world multilateral sanctions are hard to come by.
The issue of sanctions as a non-proliferation measure was brought into bold relief last year by the challenges posed by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests - tests carried out in the face of unilateral American sanctions laws that contained no escape hatch from implementation beyond a one time delay of thirty legislative days. International sanctions on Iraq were also put to the test by the defiance of Saddam Hussain against the U.N. - mandated activities of Unscom in finding and destroying Iraq’s capabilities to produce weapons of mass destruction.
In both cases the threat of severe sanctions failed to produce a desired policy result, namely, no nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, and cooperation with Unscom by Iraq.
At the same time, the record of using carrots or economic blandishments for achieving desired changes in the policies of other countries has not exactly been sterling this past year, as the Agreed framework with North Korea is in great trouble, and China’s repressive attitude toward dissidents continues unabated.
Indeed, it was the failures of such traditional soft paths of diplomacy that resulted in many of the sanctions laws in the first place. 
U. S. sanctions laws in the nuclear area, which started with the Symington and Glenn Amendments in 1976 and 1977 respectively, were the natural reaction to more than two decades of nuclear promotion and cooperation designed to foster free trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology that threatened to spread the bomb faster than the international institutional capability to control and prevent it. The Symington and Glenn Amendments, in particular were prompted by proposed sales of reprocessing plants to South Korea and Pakistan by France, and a proposed sale to Brazil of full fuel cycle facilities, including an enrichment plant, by Germany. Ultimately, none of these deals went through, although considerable technology transfer did take place. And Pakistan ended up being cut off from U.S. economic and military assistance in the late 1970s as a result of its importation of enrichment equipment for the construction of the Kahuta plant. That began a dance between Pakistan and the U.S. over the Pakistani nuclear program that ultimately led to the Glenn Amendment of 1994 and the argument over U.S. reaction to the Indian and Pakistani tests of last year.

The Glenn Amendment of 1994 had its provenance in the Glenn Amendment of 1981. This was an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act that was prompted by the newly elected Reagan Administration’s desire to repeal the Symington Amendment in order to be able to send arms through Pakistan to the Mujahedin to fight the Russians in Afghanistan. Congress was unwilling to repeal the Symington Amendment, but agreed to a six-year waiver explicitly for Pakistan. Since there was at this time overwhelming information as to the nature and intent of the Pakistani nuclear program, Senator Glenn attached an amendment to the waiver legislation requiring a cutoff of economic and military assistance to Pakistan if she set off a nuclear test. And because the Reagan Administration appeared so hell-bent to fight a proxy war with the Soviets using the Mujahedin, there was concern whether a nuclear test by Pakistan would result in a U.S. sanction while the Afghanistan war was being pursued. So Ronald Reagan was given no waiver to exercise in the event of a nuclear test by Pakistan. This provision regarding Pakistan, which was produced because of special legislation explicitly favorable to Pakistan, was broadened on the Senate Floor to apply to nuclear tests by any non-weapon state. Thus, the Glenn Amendment of 1981 was enacted that automatically required a cutoff of assistance to any non-weapon state that set off a nuclear explosion. Congress clearly gave non-proliferation in South Asia higher priority than an open-ended commitment to sending arms to the Mujahedin - a wise choice that has been validated by events in that area since then.

The Glenn Amendment of 1994 simply added more sanctions for nuclear testing to those of the Glenn Amendment of 1981, particularly those involving loans and credits by multilateral and domestic financial institutions and U.S. Government agencies. It was these sanctions, however, following the Indian and Pakistani tests, that resulted in Congress backtracking from its previously strong non-proliferation position.

First, the sanctions prevented credits from the Department of Agriculture from being extended to Pakistan for the purchase of U.S. grain. U.S. farmers howled about it to their representatives, and their representatives responded by immediately removing that sanction from the law.

Second, the sanctions threatened to plunge Pakistan into economic bankruptcy with possible political instability. Although it was Pakistan’s decision to spend its treasure on the bomb rather than use it for development, the Administration convinced Congressional policymakers that there was a risk of producing a situation that might result in the creation of another anti-American fundamentalist Islamic government. So, with images of the Taliban dancing in their heads and with visits from USA Engage and other commercial interests on their calendars, the Congress, with the active support of the Administration, passed the Brownback Amendment to give the President a one-year waiver authority over the sanctions. The President immediately used it to restore normal international lending and trading activities with India and Pakistan minus military and some dual use trade. This has been greeted with approval by U.S. industry and most of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and it seems probable that all remaining sanctions will be lifted if the Indians and Pakistanis sign the CTBT later this year.

Thus we have an interesting paradox. Using South Asia as the example, the threat of sanctions is pronounced by some, including some in Congress, as ineffective in deterring a determined proliferator, but the same sanctions are deemed too harsh as punishment, and therefore are abandoned, at least in part, after being triggered. This violates an old political axiom that one should never make a threat that one is unprepared to carry out, but the consequences go further than that. Legalistic arguments aside, the principles behind the non-proliferation regime are being challenged in South Asia and Iraq, and the erosion of support for sanctions in those contexts suggests that the regime may be embarking on a slippery slope downward in terms of effectiveness. It is hard to see how to avoid this if there is no consensus that the flouting of the regime’s principles should result in appropriate sanctions by the regime’s adherents, and particularly by its leaders.

Nonetheless, there are strong arguments that finding such consensus in today’s world is unlikely except in dealing with pariah states and that, in any case, sanctions are a poor policy choice in attacking vexing and complicated political problems. That’s true, but begs the real question. No one that I know of argues that sanctions should be the first line in a non-proliferation policy worthy of the name. Sanctions, in fact, are or should be the last resort prior to military action in preventing proliferation. And if, after all the diplomatic stops have been pulled out and sanctions don’t or can’t work but military action is inappropriate in a given situation, the non-proliferation battle has been lost and you’re left with deterrence as a policy. Those who argue that sanctions should not be a part of the non-proliferation policy arsenal are arguing, in effect, that counterproliferation or the threat and use of military action should be moved up in the hierarchical list of policy choices when facing a proliferation threat. That is unlikely to produce more multilateral support than a sanctions policy. Indeed, the imposition and subsequent failure of sanctions can sometimes be a tool for generating support for a tougher stance, providing, of course, that non-proliferation continues to be a shared value.

So the question shouldn’t be whether sanctions, even unilateral sanctions, are an appropriate policy response to proliferation activity. And don’t take my word for it. Take the word of the person who recently said in a speech about South Asia:

     [The sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan] were necessary for several reasons. First it’s the law. Second, sanctions create  a   disincentive for other states to exercise the nuclear option if they are contemplating it. And third, sanctions are part of our effort
     to keep faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop
     them. Several of those nations have are living proof that having nuclear weapons is not a prerequisite for survival or security.

I couldn’t have said it better than Strobe Talbot did. It’s a pity that the speech was made after the most effective sanctions were lifted, and with no substantive new concessions on the part of India and Pakistan regarding their nuclear weapon programs.
In the wake of the decisions regarding South Asia proliferation, and with the realization that imposing tough sanctions that are then lifted because they’re tough is probably worse than not imposing them in the first place, it is important to try to better understand what kind of sanctions are both effective and politically supportable against proliferators with "friends". The South Asia situation suggests that we are dealing with a very narrow margin for action.

The Economic Effects of the Sanctions on India and Pakistan
Remarks (as prepared) of Daniel Morrow, (Resident Associate and Director, Politics of Economic Reform Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace)

The debate about the future utility of the Glenn Amendment as an instrument of US policy needs to be based on a factual
assessment of the economic impact of the sanctions on India and Pakistan. Michael Carriere, my colleague at the Carnegie
Endowment, and I have been tracking the sanctions and analyzing their impacts. This morning I will summarize our assessment. 

Under the provision of law known as the Glenn Amendment, after the nuclear bomb tests in May 1998, the US government was
required to impose various sanctions on India and Pakistan. These sanctions included suspending bilateral foreign aid, opposing
loans from the international financial institutions, and stopping credits from official agencies such as the Ex-Im Bank. Several other
countries--Japan, Germany, Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden--also suspended bilateral aid programs as a sanction against India and Pakistan.

These sanctions might have economic impacts through three distinct channels: 

          changes in financial flows through bilateral creditors and agencies; 
          changes in flows from the international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank; and 
          changes in private capital flows as an indirect response to the presence of the official sanctions. 

In my remarks, I will consider all three of these channels.

India

Let me start with the case of India. During the months following the nuclear tests in May, net capital inflows to India fell sharply. For April-June 1998 the net inflow was about $4.2 billion less than in the same quarter in 1997. This amount is modest but not
insignificant relative to the whole Indian economy: its equivalent to about 1% of GDP and 4% of gross domestic investment. 

This decline in capital inflows reflected changes in almost all categories of private flows, but flows of official foreign aid have changed very little so far. As shown in Graph 1, foreign investment in India fell sharply in May 1998 and remained well below the levels of 1997. Both foreign direct investment and portfolio investments fell. Receipts from external commercial borrowing were also
significantly lower after May 1998. However, disbursements of foreign aid have not yet been much affected primarily because
development assistance agencies stopped new commitments, not disbursements of previously contracted loans. In this context, it is important to distinguish between two types of lending--project loans, which normally disburse slowly over 4 to 8 years after
commitment, and quick-disbursing loans such as IMF financing and adjustment lending by the World Bank, which disburse within 1 to 2 years. India--unlike Pakistan--has not been receiving quick-disbursing funds. So cutting new commitments does not significantly affect disbursements for several years.

Initially, the decline in net capital inflows brought about a decline in India's foreign exchange reserves as shown in Graph 2. But this did not induce any financial market panic because India's initial reserve position was strong: at the end of April 1998 the foreign exchange reserves of $26 billion equalled about 6 months worth of imports. Furthermore, India was able to compensate for this initial loss of capital inflows through the sale of the so-called Resurgent India Bonds to non-resident Indians. This bond issue brought in over $4 billion, and by October 1998 total reserves exceeded the April level. Going forward, if private capital inflows were not restored, it remains to be seen whether or not India could continue to compensate via such borrowings. In any event, the reduction in foreign investment inflows--if sustained--would marginally reduce Indian growth rates.

The question remains how much of this change in capital inflows was due to the sanctions themselves. Three other, potentially
powerful factors were also at work: 

          a decline in international investor appetite for portfolio investments in emerging markets generally following the Asian
          crisis; 
          fear of possible military conflict in the sub-continent; and 
          the economic policy announcements by the Indian government that created concerns about fiscal policy and reversal
          of liberalization policies. 

It is impossible to fully untangle these various influences, but there is evidence that the sanctions themselves have been a relevant factor. This conclusion is based on the timing of stock market movements and on the explanations of those movements by stock
market participants. Graph 3 shows the movements during 1998 of the Bombay stock market index and also an index of Asian
stock markets (excluding India and Pakistan). The Indian market rose sharply from the beginning of the new government in March
until the nuclear tests in early May, even though the rest of Asian markets were almost unchanged. Since the tests, the Indian
market has fallen about 27% compared to a 4% decline in the rest of Asia. I believe that this reflects mostly the concerns about the economic policy direction of the Indian government. For example, in June it put forward proposals to raise import tariffs. But, during June and July, there were some significant market moves that were apparently driven by the sanctions. Immediately after the US announced the details of its sanctions on June 18, the Indian market fell almost 10% relative to the rest of Asia. And, following the US Senate vote to weaken the sanctions by permitting agricultural export credits, the Indian market rose about 12% relative to the international market. There were, of course, other factors at play. In particular, on June 19, Moody's announced its downgrade of the Indian credit rating. But, looking through the Indian financial press throughout this period, it is striking that traders paid a lot of attention to the latest news about the scope and potential duration of the sanctions. A typical example was on July 16th--the day after the Senate approved the Brownback Amendment that would give the president authority to waive sanctions. The Indian stock market rose 3.7 percent, and the Times of India headline was "Shares Sparkle on Sanction Waiver Hopes."

There is another interesting barometer that measures specifically foreign investor sentiment toward Indian stocks. This is the market for Global Depository Receipts--called GDRs--that are traded in London. Graph 4 shows the movements of the GDR premium. This is the average difference between the GDR price and the price of that stock in the Indian market. The equilibrium difference is about plus 10%--reflecting tax and transition cost advantages of the GDRs. After the tests, the GDR premium fell to about zero--reflecting a loss of foreign investor interest in Indian stocks. In mid-June, when the US clarified the sanctions, the premium fell sharply again to about minus 10%--but recovered quickly to zero after the Senate voted to allow agricultural export credits. After the sanctions were relaxed, the GDR premium returned to above 5%. 

This evidence from the stock market suggests to me that the sanctions themselves--although not the most important driver of market sentiment--were a significant factor. 

So the bottomline for the case of India is this: sanctions have had a marginal—but not negligible¾ effect on India. The indirect
effects via private capital flows have been more important so far than the direct effects of changes in official aid flows. The sanctions would have greater effect only if they remain in place for several years and thereby affect significantly the disbursement of official creditors.

Pakistan

The story for Pakistan is quite different. Before the nuclear bomb tests, its external financial position was already precarious. In April 1998, its foreign reserves of $1.36 billion equaled only about 1 1/2 months of imports. Its current account deficit was over 3 % of GDP--meaning that it would need almost $2 billion in net inflows during 1998 to avoid further loss of reserves and/or reduced imports.Because of this weak external position, in October 1997 Pakistan entered into an agreement with the IMF for $1.56 billion in IMF credit. In May 1998, $1.2 billion of that amount remained undisbursed. Private sector confidence depended significantly on that IMF support. 

In this circumstance, the expectation that the sanctions would block this on-going IMF support caused a collapse of market
confidence. New private inflows virtually stopped. As shown in Graph 4, foreign exchange reserves fell to extremely low levels. This
collapse in confidence was also apparent in the Karachi stock market. Graph 5 shows that it fell sharply from May; by mid-July it
had fallen 34% more than the rest of Asia stock markets. 

In this case, the sanctions have had a strong effect because the US and other shareholders in the IMF formed a coalition to block
disbursement of the IMF credit. It is important to recognize that the US holds less than 18% of the voting shares in these
institutions. And so the US government had to take a multilateral approach. At the summit meeting in London on June 12, the G7
governments plus Russia announced their joint position to postpone any non-humanitarian lending by the IFIs to Pakistan and India.
Together the G7 countries have about 45% of the votes in the IMF and the Bank. Other such as the Nordics countries have taken the same position. I should note that the very strong tradition in these institutions is to avoid voting within their Boards of Executive
Directors. The tradition has been that, if the management determines through consultations that shareholders with a majority of
voting shares oppose a loan, then that loan is not presented to the Executive Directors for approval.

Concluding Observations

Let me conclude with two general lessons.

First, sanctions such as imposed by the Glenn Amendment can have significant indirect effects through the international capital
markets. Under certain circumstances, the magnitude of these indirect effects could be much larger than the direct effects of
sanctions. Countries that are more dependent on flows from the international capital markets are more vulnerable to these indirect
effects, although that vulnerability can be reduced in the short run by large foreign exchange reserves. These indirect effects--driven
by the expectations of market players--are likely to be strongest if the sanctions are imposed automatically by law and if their
removal is known to be a politically difficult process.

Second, sanctions by the US can affect the operations of the international financial institutions only if there is a broad coalition
among the shareholders of these institutions. And the impact of withholding commitments from the IFIs is significant in the near-term only when the sanctioned country has an acute need for quick-disbursing, policy-based lending. 

Berger: U.S. Ready To Make Any Necessary Changes To ABM
By Frank Wolfe (Defense Daily, January 14, 1999,Pg. 5)
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger told a non-proliferation conference this week that the United States stands ready to modify, "with our other treaty parties," the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union should such changes be required in order to deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) system.
Pentagon officials have said it is increasingly likely that a deployment decision on NMD will be made in 2001, not in 2000 as
originally planned (Defense Daily, Jan. 11). Berger’s comment about the possible modification of the ABM treaty also comes as the Russian Duma is considering ratification of the START II arms reduction treaty. 
NMD and theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD) have become top Pentagon development priorities as missile technology spreads to rogue nations like North Korea. Berger said the United States has "stepped up" its theater ballistic missile defense cooperation with Israel and Japan.
"We’re also committed to the development of a limited national missile defense system that could, if we decide, be deployed to
counter the emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue nations," Berger told the conference, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "In the next budget we present to Congress, we will propose to include funds, approximately $7 billion over the next six years, that would be necessary if we later decide to deploy a limited National Missile Defense System."
Boeing [BA] won a $1.6 billion contract last spring as NMD’s lead system integrator. The Pentagon plans on including $400 million
out of the $7 billion for NMD in FY ‘00, bringing the budget for the system to about $1.3 billion in FY ‘00 (Defense Daily, Jan. 8).
"Let me be clear," Berger said. "We remain strongly committed to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a cornerstone of our
security. And we would seek agreement with our other treaty parties if any missile defense activities necessitated modifying the
ABM Treaty."

China, U.S. Boost Efforts to Ratify Nuclear Test Ban by Year End (Reuters, 13/1/99)
The United States and China -- two of the world's five major nuclear powers -- said on Tuesday they were accelerating efforts to ensure an international pact banning nuclear tests is ratified by the end of 1999. 
Speaking at an arms control conference, U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger said President Bill Clinton (pictured in archive photo)  would push for U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as one of his "top priorities" of 1999.  Clinton is determined to strengthen international controls on weapons of mass destruction and would likely lay out the case for Senate action on the treaty in his State of the Union address, set for Jan.19, Berger said. 
At the same conference sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ambassador Sha Zukang said China was "accelerating its preparatory work" and would submit the treaty to the People's Congress for ratification during the first part of the year.  "All states concerned should sign and ratify the treaty as soon as possible (so) that the treaty can enter into force at an early date," said Sha, director general of the Department of Arms Control and Disarmament in China's Foreign Ministry. 
 The CTBT has been signed by 151 countries but cannot enter into force until the United States and a number of other specific nations, including India and Pakistan, ratify it. 
 India and Pakistan had ruled out membership in the pact until last September when their leaders separately told the U.N. General Assembly in New York they would aim to join the CTBT by September 1999. 
The two South Asian nations have faced international condemnation and U.S. sanctions for conducting nuclear tests last May that set back  international efforts to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 
 "If we fail to ratify, we will undercut our own efforts to curb further nuclear arms development, particularly in South Asia where India and Pakistan each have announced an intention to adhere to the CTBT by September of this
year," Berger said. "That is the right choice for those countries, one we have been urging for some time. Senate action on the CTBT before September will greatly strengthen our hand in persuading India and Pakistan to fulfil their pledges," he said. 
 The treaty bans all nuclear explosive tests. In this way, it "will constrain the  development of more advanced nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers and limit the possibilities for other states to acquire such weapons (and) will enhance our ability to detect and deter suspicious activities by other nations," Berger said. 
He acknowledged that winning approval in the Senate, where Sen. Jesse Helms -- Republican of North Carolina and the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- is among the strong opponents, would be difficult. But he warned that "if the Senate rejected or failed to act on the test ban treaty, we would throw open the door to regional nuclear arms races and a much more dangerous world." 
Berger said the deadline created by the announcement by India and Pakistan that they would drop their longstanding opposition and sign the treaty by September may enhance prospects for Senate approval this year. Later, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson underscored the U.S. push on CTBT and gave assurances that the U.S. ability to monitor the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile with computers and other technology instead of  testing was robust and effective. 
"Today in our laboratories we use computers that have one thousand times the power of those that we used only six years ago to answer questions about the condition of our weapons," he told the conference.  "This program has enabled us to maintain confidence in our nuclear deterrent," he said.  In his speech, Sha expressed a remarkable convergence between the United States and China on many arms control issues reflecting major changes in Beijing's views over the past 10 to 20 years, such as the need to "exert all our efforts" to stop and reverse nuclear weapons programs in India and Pakistan. But he also underscored differences.  He suggested the U.S.-favored international regime aimed at controlling  missile technology may need to be revised and warned Washington against helping Japan and Taiwan develop theatre missile defense systems. Sha also urged the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy toward nuclear weapons. But U.S. officials said they had no intention of changing  the longstanding policy of retaining the use of nuclear weapons as an option.

China Sees Arms Race if Japan, Taiwan Upgrade Missiles (THE 7TH CARNEGIE INTERNATIONAL  NON-PROLIFERATION CONFERENCE, January 11-12, 1999) 
Washington, Jan. 12 (Bloomberg)--China's top arms control official warned that efforts by Japan and Taiwan to improve their
defense against ballistic missiles could ignite a new regional arms race. ``If a country, in addition to its offensive power, seeks to
develop advanced theater missile defense in an attempt to attain absolute security and unilateral strategic advantage, other
countries will be forced to develop more advanced offensive missiles,'' said Ambassador Sha Zukang, director general of that
nation's arms control and disarmament division. ``This will give rise to a new round of arms race and will be in nobody's
interest.''Zukang was suggesting how China might respond if Taiwan and Japan continue to increase their missile defense capabilities with U.S. assistance. ``We hope that the United States government could take a more cautious and responsible attitude on this matter,'' he said. Zukang's remarks came as U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen traveled to Japan to discuss missile defense cooperation and other issues. The U.S. supports Taiwan's bid to buy more Raytheon Co. Patriot missiles to complement an air defense system that Raytheon adapted for its use. The U.S. reportedly is also considering a request by Taiwan to purchase four U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers equipped with Lockheed Martin electronics to shoot down ballistic missiles. China in March 1996 precipitated a crisis in the Taiwan Straits when it fired four Dong Feng-15 short-range ballistic missiles into the waters off Taiwan prior to the island's national elections. U.S. Navy intelligence later concluded the missile firings were part of a practice run for an all-out invasion of Taiwan.Regional concerns about ballistic missiles were elevated on August 31 when North Korea test-fired its new long-range Taepo Dong missile into the Sea of Japan. Zukang's remarks came at a conference on controlling the
spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Zukang made two arguments for halting the spread of theater missile defense. One is that the introduction of such technology
will inevitably resulted in the proliferation of both defensive and offensive capabilities. ``Many of the technologies used in anti-missile systems are easily applicable in offensive missiles,'' he said. ``This is one of the main reasons why China stands against cooperation between the United States and Japan to develop theater missile defense and opposes any transfer of systems to Taiwan.'' Secondly, Zukang said, China is opposed to the U.S. assisting Taiwan's missile defense because of its ``adverse
impact on China's reunification.'' ``Theater missile defense in Taiwan will give the pro-independence forces a false sense of security, which may incite them to reckless moves,'' he said. ``This can only lead to instability across the Taiwan Straits or even the entire Northeast Asian region.'' Zukang said the reunification of the mainland and Taiwan ``was only natural.'' The issue of China's long-range ballistic missile capabilities are due for public debate this spring when a bipartisan congressional committee that examined transfers of U.S. technology issues its declassified report. The committee reviewed the extent to which China's intercontinental ballistic missile technology was improved with the assistance of U.S. corporations. It concluded that national security was harmed.
--Tony Capaccio in the Washington newsroom 

N-tests: India had 'no other option' (The Hindu, 14/1/99)
By Sridhar Krishnaswami, WASHINGTON, Jan. 13. 
India is committed to a comprehensive and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament regime and will not accept ``discriminatory export control regimes'' or ``submit to measures that are intrusive and sovereignty-violative,'' according to Mr. T. P. Sreenivasan, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Indian Embassy here. 
 Mr. Sreenivasan told a panel discussion on ``South Asia: Fallout From The Tests''  organised by the Carnegie Endowment here that India was not seeking to undermine or destroy the existing non- proliferation systems; it remained fully committed to setting up a comprehensive, universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament regime. He argued that while India's status might have changed after the tests, its objectives on nuclear disarmament - as being the only way to ensure peace and security in the world - had not. India approached disarmament issues with a global perspective.``The objective remains steady, but the options have been shrinking since  1947,'' he said. 
The Indian Embassy official spoke of a ``mutual misunderstanding'' - with India hoping  that the nuclear weapons States would eliminate their arsenals and the nuclear  weapons States on their part imagining that India's security needs did not include a minimum nuclear deterrence. He said the regional and global events in the last four  decades - including the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and the conclusion of the CTBT which was neither ``comprehensive'' nor a ``test ban''- had left  India with no other option but to go in for a minimum nuclear deterrent. 
Mr.Sreenivasan said India had indicated its willingness to engage in good faith negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and was willing to work with the U.S. and other like minded countries to arrive at a non-discriminatory treaty that will end future production of fissile material for weapons purposes. 
 India's record in exercising stringent control on export of technologies used for weapons of mass destruction was impeccable, ``something which cannot be said for some of the adherents of the NPT including the P-5 members,'' Mr.Sreenivasan said.
India ``cannot accept provisions of export control regimes such as the Nuclear  Suppliers Group, that are discriminatory in application. Nor will we accept any restraints on our R and D capacities or submit to measures that are intrusive or sovereignty violative,'' Mr.Sreenivasan maintained. 
The panel discussion was chaired by Dr.Gary Bertsch of the University of Georgia. The other participants were Mr. Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Non- Proliferation, Mr. Shahid Kamal from the Pakistan Embassy, Mr.Cheng Ruisheng, former Chinese Ambassador to India, and Dr.George Perkovich, Director of the World Security Programme. 
 Outlining the nature of the discussions among the U.S., India and Pakistan, Mr.Einhorn said the Clinton Administration had cause for concern on some fronts. For  instance, on FMCT the U.S. is concerned that neither India nor Pakistan was agreeing to a moratorium until a treaty is finalised. This, he said, would result in fissile material piling up even as a treaty is negotiated over a period of time. 
On weaponisation and deployment, Mr. Einhorn said there had been only some generalised pledges and that Washington was not yet clear about how New Delhi and Islamabad defined the concept of minimum deterrence.``There is little concrete evidence that either is genuinely prepared to limit their strategic options,'' he remarked. One of the U.S. key goals was to find out the Indian and Pakistani notions of national security and whether they could be reconciled with the existing non-proliferation regimes. 
Mr. Einhorn said that while significant steps had been taken in the U.S.' dialogue with  India and Pakistan, there was yet some way to go. He said the two countries would not take the remaining steps under duress or to please the U.S. but these steps were  vital for the security, political and economic interests of the two countries. 
Mr. Einhorn reiterated - what other senior officials have in the last several months - that the ultimate American goal would be to make India and Pakistan to forgo the nuclear weapons capability and sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As this was not possible in
the foreseeable future, the near term goal would be, among other things, to see the avoidance of a costly arms race in the region and bolster the non-proliferation regime. 
PTI reports: Mr. Einhorn said the Prime Minister, Mr.A.B. Vajpayee's U.N. speech was only an expression of intent to adhere to the CTBT. He said the U.S. had no other assurances from India on the CTBT. However, Mr. Sreenivasan said ``the Prime Minister's words were: `India is prepared to bring the discussions to a successful conclusion so that entry into force of CTBT is not delayed beyond September 1999.' That is reassurance enough.'' 

Sanctions Imposed on 3 Russian Institutions U.S. Cites Missile, Nuclear Aid to Iran
 By Thomas W. Lippman ( Washington Post, 13/1/99) 
The Clinton administration imposed economic penalties on a Russian university and two scientific research institutes yesterday after determining  that they had aided Iran's efforts to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.The sanctions bring to 12 the number of Russian corporations and institutions penalized by Washington for selling materials and technology to Iran in the year since Russia adopted export controls aimed at curbing such commerce. Senior administration officials said that while those controls have had some impact and have blocked some sales to Iran, Russia's economic crisis appears to have increased the temptation for Russian institutions to circumvent the rules and seek cash through exports of prohibited items. The export issue has been a continuous irritant to U.S.-Russia relations, even when those relations were on a much friendlier plane than they are now, in the wake of Russia's economic collapse last summer and friction over U.S. airstrikes against Iraq. Proliferation will "certainly be on the agenda" when Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright travels to Moscow later this month, a White House official said.
White House national security adviser Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger announced  the penalties in a speech yesterday morning at a conference on weapons proliferation sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
 "Let me be very clear," Berger said. "The administration has authority to act against entities that violate international nonproliferation standards, and we will use that authority to protect our security. In the end, though, the most effective shield against proliferation from Russia is not U.S. penalties but a Russian export control system that is designed to work, and does. Only Russia can police its own borders, factories and technology industries." The institutions targeted yesterday were the D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology and the Moscow Aviation Institute. 
All are barred from purchasing U.S.-made goods, exporting products to the United States or selling to the U.S. government, and all aid to them will be cut  off. David Leavy, spokesman for the National Security Council, said the sanctions will remain in place "until we determine it is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to lift them, or until their  activities have ceased." In punishing the power technology institute, the administration appeared to be sending a strong message to Yevgeny Adamov, its former director, now Russia's atomic energy minister. The institute has announced plans to build a small nuclear reactor in Iran that was billed as a research facility but is capable of producing fissile materials that could be used in nuclear weapons. Together, the three organizations penalized yesterday allegedly helped Iran make progress toward overcoming the biggest obstacles its weapons programs faced, stabilizing the flight path of missiles and acquiring fissile material.
"The United States will continue to work with Russia to strengthen controls on such exports and to enforce compliance with the laws, policies and international agreements on such transfers," a White House statement said.Vice President Gore said the same thing, in similar words, after the previous round of sanctions, in July.
In a related matter, Robert G. Bell, Berger's top arms control aide, told the same conference that because the Russian parliament has still not ratified the START II nuclear arms reduction treaty, the administration is considering taking unilateral arms control steps as well as pursuing the "treaty track" with Moscow.
 Reflecting how far the White House had gone in preparation for an expected START II ratification, Bell said President Clinton had already signed off on the  decision papers for START III negotiations, including the opening statement the U.S. delegation would deliver at that negotiation. But with Russian approval of START II delayed, Bell indicated that Albright's trip to Moscow may involve exploring possible unilateral steps because "we need a combination of treaty and less formal" initiatives.
Staff writers Walter Pincus in Washington and David Hoffman in Moscow  contributed to this report.